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Certain risks - for example, those posed by genetically modified organisms - carry huge uncertainty, such that numeric values for probabilities and even
for consequences are mostly speculative. In such cases, attempts to carry out quantitative hazard analysis are at best optimistic, and they can be misleading because numbers
are often mistaken for accuracy. But the majority of risks subjected to analysis are concerned with the operation of equipment, the hazards involved in processes, and the
safety of products. These, in most cases, are better understood. This does not mean that they don't carry uncertainty or that they are immune to subjectivity, but their
analyses, whether quantitative or qualitative, are, in the main, effective in leading to risk reduction. Evidence for this exists in the vast number of industrial plants in
operation, and products on the market, that the public does not perceive as risk issues. However subjective it may be, risk analysis is a valuable tool, and modern safety
standards demand that it be carried out. Indeed, U.K. law requires most businesses to produce documented risk analyses. But it could be improved.
The subjectivity identified above is a vulnerability, but it is also one of the principal strengths of the process. Identifying and analyzing hazards and
making decisions about risks demand human thought and human investigation. If the process were automated, it would not benefit from the human ability to probe and to take the
situation as it is, rather than as some programmer previously generalized it as being. But human delving means that something is always likely to be missed and some things may
be misjudged. Thus, it is important for risk analysts to understand and allow for the subjective influences on the process. These should be addressed in training and in
planning and managing the risk-analysis processes. 
About the Author
Felix Redmill is a consultant in risk management, project management and quality improvement, and the author and/or editor of many articles and
books on risk and other technical subjects. He holds degrees in Electrical Engineering (London) and Computation (Manchester), is a Fellow of the
Institution of Electrical Engineers and the British Computer Society, and is a Member of the Institute of Quality Assurance. He spent more than 20 years
in industry, as engineer and manager, in both communications and system development, before starting his consulting business.
Felix has been the Coordinator of the Safety-critical Systems Club (U.K.) since its inauguration in 1991. He has been a visiting lecturer at various
universities, served as chairman and member of various professional committees, and been a long-standing member of the European Workshop
on Industrial Computer Systems. He is a frequently invited speaker to professional groups, and was the Awards Banquet speaker at the 18th
International System Safety Conference in Orlando, Florida.
Acknowledgments
This paper was first published by the Institution of Electrical Engineers in its Journal of Engineering Management, Vol. 12, No. 2, April 2002.
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