2. The ability to identify an issue must be
coupled with a willingness to speak out. For
example, the safety personnel present at critical
meetings while Columbia circled the earth during
the STS-107 mission were dedicated, and they
knew the related safety assessments. Yet the
Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB)
Report criticized their performance, noting,
"… safety personnel were present
but passive and did not serve as a channel for
the voicing of concerns of dissenting views."
"Safety representatives attended meetings
of the Debris Assessment Team, Mission Evaluation
Room, and Mission Management Team, but were
merely party to the analysis process and conclusions
instead of an independent source of questions
and challenges." [CAIB Report, vol. I,
p. 170] The CAIB also drew discomforting parallels
to the "silent" role of a previous
generation of safety professionals noted in
the Rogers Commission report on the Challenger
accident in 1986. Part of the willingness to
speak up is the acceptance that this may require
taking an unpopular stand, even to the point
of non-concurrence with a majority opinion.
3. Every outstanding practitioner
exhibits certain leadership qualities:
a. The skill to "win over" others to their position,
including the ability to present a position
and defend it
b. A sense of teamwork that encourages inputs
from all parties involved
c. The ability to focus on the issue and the
search for the best solution
d. A sense of fairness, honesty and respect
for opposing positions
4. A sense of responsibility
that acknowledges the expectations of the customer
(developer and/or user of the product):
a. Relentless pursuit of
resolution of issues
b. Meticulous system analysis (including hazard
identification and resolution)
c. Commitment to the role of safety advocate
5. The most overlooked quality
in our system safety character is the ability
to critically review our own performance. Successful
self-assessment requires the application of
all of our knowledge and skills. It requires
an assessment of both the quality of the system
safety effort (products and services) and how
the effort is utilized. The CAIB Report observed
that, "Structure and process places Shuttle
safety programs in the unenviable position of
having to choose between rubber-stamping engineering
analyses, technical efforts, and Shuttle program
decisions, or trying to carry the day during
a committee meeting in which the other side
almost always has more information and analytic
capability." [CAIB Report, vol. I, p. 187]
Clearly, this is not the kind of situation that
leads to the best products or the most effective
contribution to a program.
In short, we would submit that
it takes more than dedication, knowledge, experience,
special skills and even knowledge of the latest
safety fight song. We would add system safety
character, which includes a little common sense
and a lot of true grit.