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Well, here it is, my first issue as Technical Editor of Journal of System Safety, and it seems like words are failing me already. It is somewhat intimidating to follow in the footsteps of the system safety giants that have served as editor, such as Niles Welch, Charlie Hoes, George Peters and others. I must confess that I am much flattered and honored at having been asked to fill the position.
The first thing I would like to do is thank Niles for the job he has done the last 10 years as editor. I would also like to thank Ann Waterman for all the work she has given to JSS, in getting each issue out on time and improving the quality and content of JSS. Thanks, Niles and Ann.
My overall goal as editor is to continue the same level of content and quality that has been established. In working toward that goal I would like to challenge you, the readers of JSS, to submit more articles, letters and opinions to print in JSS. After all, this is your journal, and your ideas and thoughts are what make it a success.
I would also like to start a "mishap of the month column." I am asking readers to send in information, and possibly a photo, of some incredible or ridiculous mishap that has occurred. The purpose is to share among readers the lessons learned on mishaps that really should never have happened, except through ignorance, negligence or lack of system safety. If this works out well, I will try to obtain some reward we can give to the person whose mishap has been selected for publication. So, please start sending in those mishaps.
Since JSS is really the journal for system safety engineers and analysts, I would like to hear ideas for improvement of this publication. I have never known safety engineers to be shy, so please tell me your views on JSS and how we can make it an internationally recognized and sought-after journal.
As most everyone knows, hazards and risks will always be with us. Therefore, it is imperative to fully understand the concept of both. This issue of JSS contains some enlightening articles on hazards, risk analysis perceptions and weapon fratricide risk.
Don Swallom presents an article on the value and importance of correctly and properly describing a hazard. The Source-Mechanism-Output methodology provides clear guidelines for the content and description of a hazard. My guess is that the ideas presented in his article will help to advance the state-of-the-art in hazard theory.
Michelle Arevalo and Geoffrey Bland's article is about calculating the probability of weapon fratricide between two weapon systems on a ship. The Arevalo and Bland article is a special reprint of one of the four best papers presented at the International System Safety Conference (ISSC) in Baltimore this past August. Preventing weapon fratricide is an important safety concern for the Navy for protection of ship personnel and also for protection and availability of Navy assets.
Ira Rimson and Ludwig Benner present another interesting solicitude in their Outside the Lines column. They touch on the topic of "do we really know what we know" when we perform risk analysis. This causes concern because the result is that our risk analyses may not be as good as we think they are, and the same bad results may be passed on unwittingly.
In an opinion letter, David Heimerdinger asks questions about the safety issues of Open Architecture (OA) and COTS. OA is now one of the hot topics in the Navy, and perhaps not enough safety questions are being asked, and answered, in regard to the safety assurance being given to OA COTS.
Until next time,
Les agneaux broutaient paisiblement l'herbe tendre.
Clif
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