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Vol. 43, No. 6 • Nov.-Dec. 2007
Outside the Lines

What Do You Really Know?

What does any analyst need to know in order to reach a valid conclusion regarding human behavior in given circumstances? At the outset, the analyst should know what happened. In addition, it is highly advisable to verify that the facts upon which any assumptions will be based are valid. Next, it helps to know what you really know. The author asserts in this case not only that he knew what the crew knew, he also assumes what the crew did not know, ignoring the impossibility of proving a negative.11

The writer's argument is tautology — a circuitous repetition of unverified assumptions, each feeding from its predecessor, as to the crew's knowledge (or lack of same).

If we accept the writer's assumption that "…the crew knew the potential criticality of trying to take off on a short runway," then they should never have attempted the take-off without accurately ascertaining their position on the airfield. Logic suggests that, if they knew the criticality of the wrong decision, then they would have ensured that they were on the correct runway.12

On the other hand, the writer asserts that the crew "…just didn't know they were doing such a thing." If the crew knew the potential criticality of attempting to take off on the shorter runway, but chose not to ascertain that they were on the longer one and "gave it a go anyway," then the crew not only violated FAA regulations and their training, they deliberately risked 50 lives and fatally misjudged the criticality of their decision — if they considered it at all.

Whatever the motivation for their behavior, and whatever you choose to call it, we stand by our contention that the crew made a fatal error in judgment. It resulted in 49 unnecessary deaths, and possibly the demise of the airline.

We invite arguments pro or con from our readers.13

 

Copyright © 2007 by Ira J. Rimson and Ludwig Benner, Jr. All rights reserved.
 

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11 The author could not have studied the NTSB's "Probable Cause" statement because it was not released publicly until late July, 2007, well after the issue went to press.
12 This is especially significant in this case, as there are two runways that originate in the same vicinity on the airfield: one is sufficiently long to have accommodated the attempted takeoff; the other is not.
13 Thanks to Mike Murphy, who provided epistemological review and input.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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